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INTRODUCTION

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits sex-based
classifications in employment decisions related to the hire and discharge of individuals and in decisions related to other terms and
conditions of employment.' It is unlawful for an employer to "classify his employees . . . in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's ... sex .... ,, 2 The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978

1.42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
2. Id. at (a)(2).
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further provides that, under Title VII, discrimination on the basis
of sex includes discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.'
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the language
of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) to mean what its clear
language says: "for all Title VII purposes, discrimination based on
a woman's pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because of her
sex. ' 4 Under Title VII, discrimination on the basis of sex is allowable only if sex is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the employer's particular business.5 Yet, several federal appellate courts failed to apply
this BFOQ defense to sex discrimination when considering cases involving employers' policies which excluded women from jobs on the
basis of their pregnancy or their capacity to become pregnant. 6 The
need arose to address the conflict existing between various courts
7
in their treatment of such fetal-protection policies.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court, in InternationalUnion v. Johnson Controls, Inc. (hereinafter Johnson Controls),8 considered whether an employer, in seeking to protect potential fetuses
from workplace hazards, could discriminate against women who had
the capacity to become pregnant. In a class action brought by Johnson Controls, Inc. (hereinafter Johnson Controls) employees in UAW
bargaining units, the Court was asked to determine whether the company's policy, which barred fertile women from jobs involving exposure or potential exposure to lead, was sex discrimination in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 9 In order to
resolve this question, the Supreme Court was required to address
the following issues:

3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
4. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 684 (1983) (holding
that a company's health insurance plan, which provided less extensive pregnancy benefits to the spouses
of male employees than it provided to female employees, discriminated against male employees).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1988).
6. Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (1lth Cir. 1984); Wright v. Olin Corp.,
697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982); Zuniga v. IKeberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1982).
7. International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., I11 S. Ct. 1196, 1202 (1991).
8. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
9. Id.
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(1) whether the employer's fetal-protection policy was facially discriminatory;
(2) whether the only defense available to the employer was the BFOQ exception
to sex discrimination under Title VII;1O
(3) whether the employer's fetal-protection policy fell within the BFOQ exception
and was therefore allowable.

Ultimately, in a decision in which all of the Justices concurred
in the judgment, the Court reversed and remanded the Seventh Circuit's ruling and held that Title VII, as amended by the PDA, prohibits employers from implementing sex-specific fetal-protection
policies. 1 With this holding, the Court emphasized that the plain
language of Title VII, as amended by the PDA, means exactly what
it says: discrimination based upon a woman's capacity to become
12
pregnant is prohibited.
This Comment discusses Johnson Controls to enable the reader
to more fully comprehend the Court's decision. The holding does
raise questions regarding potential tort liability of employers for fetal
injuries caused by workplace hazards. Yet, despite possible tort liability concerns of employers arising from the Court's decision, the
Court's logical reasoning and adherence to existing law fully justified
the holding in Johnson Controls.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Johnson Controls is a battery manufacturer. Lead is a primary
ingredient used in manufacturing batteries. 3 In 1982, Johnson Controls implemented a policy under which all women who were capable
of bearing children were excluded from jobs which exposed them
to lead or which could expose them to lead through their transfer
or promotion. 4 Jobs with unacceptable lead levels were those in
which, during a twelve month period, an employee had a blood level
in excess of thirty micrograms per deciliter. 15 This is the standard

10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1988).
11. 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1209-10 (1991).
12. Id.

13. Id.at 1199.
14. Id.at 1200.
15. Id.
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recommended by the Occupational Safety and Health Administra16
tion (OSHA) for employees who intend to have children.
In 1984, employees of Johnson Controls brought a class action
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin challenging Johnson Controls' fetal-protection policy as sex
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 as amended. 17 In 1985, upon stipulation of the parties, the court
certified a class consisting of "all past, present and future production and maintenance employees" in UAW bargaining units at nine
of Johnson Controls' plants "who have been and continue to be
affected by Defendant's Fetal Protection Policy implemented in
1982." 18
The district court granted Johnson Controls' motion for summary judgment and held that Johnson Controls' fetal-protection policy did not violate Title VII.9 The court determined that the
company's fetal-protection policy was facially neutral, 20 but that it.
did have a disproportionate impact on women. 2' Because a prima
facie case of disparate impact existed, the court applied the business
necessity defense. 22 Since there was a societal interest in protecting
fetal safety, the court held there did exist a business necessity to
protect fetuses.23 The plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that there was
an acceptable alternative that would have had a lesser impact on
women.

16.
17.
18.
19.

24

29 C.F.R. app. A(II)(B)(3) § 1910.1025 (1990).
International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Wis. 1988).
Id. at 310.
Id. at 317-18.

20. The court reasoned that "because of the fetuses possibility of unknown existence to the
mother and the severe risk of harm ... the fetal protection policy is not facially discriminatory."
Id. at 316.
21. Id.
22. Id. The court applied the business necessity defense as established in Fourth and Eleventh
Circuit fetal protection cases. Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (lth Cir. 1984);
Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982). As set forth in Hayes, the business necessity
framework for analyzing sex-specific fetal-protection policies is as follows: Such a policy "violates

Title VII unless the employer shows (1) that a substantial risk of harm exists and (2) that risk is
borne only by members of one sex; and (3) the employee fails to show that there are acceptable
alternative policies that would have a lesser impact on the affected sex." Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1554.
23. International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 309, 316 (E.D. Wis. 1988).
24. Id.
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The unions and employees appealed the district court's decision. 25
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary judgment in favor of
Johnson Controls. 26 The court held that the proper standard for
evaluating Johnson Controls' fetal-protection policy was the business
necessity inquiry, 27 and that the company had satisfied that standard. 28 The court then analyzed the case under the BFOQ defense
and determined that, even under that more rigorous standard, Johnson Controls would still prevail. 29 The majority held that the company's fetal-protection policy was reasonably necessary to further
industrial safety, which was part of the essence of Johnson Controls'

business .30
Again, the unions and employees appealed, and the United States
3' The Court held that Johnson
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Controls' fetal-protection policy was sex discrimination in violation
of Title VII, as amended by the PDA.3 2 Justice Blackmun delivered
the opinion of the Court which stated that the only defense available
to Johnson Controls' facially discriminatory policy was the BFOQ
exception to sex discrimination under Title VII.33 The company did
not meet this requirement of establishing that sex was a bona fide
occupational qualification for the jobs from which fertile women
were excluded. 34 The Court emphasized that under Title VII, decisions concerning the welfare of future children are for the children's parents to make, rather than the employers of the children's
parents. 35 The Court reversed the holding of the Seventh Circuit and
remanded the case.36

25. International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989).
26. Id. at 901.
27. Id. at 886.
28. Id. at 888-93.
29. Id. at 893.
30. Id. at 896-901.
31. International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990).
32. International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1209-10 (1991).
33. Id. at 1204. The business necessity defense was inappropriate because it may be applied
only when an employer's policy is facially neutral. Johnson Controls' policy was facially discriminatory. Id. at 1203-04.
34. Id. at 1207.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1210.
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PRIOR LAW

Prior to Johnson Controls, the United States Supreme Court had
not considered Title VII questions concerning fetal safety. The Seventh Circuit's treatment of this case 7 was patterned after decisions
made by the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, which had considered
similar cases. 38 The United States Supreme Court has decided other
sex discrimination cases under Title VII and the PDA. The following
provides an overview of the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits' fetalprotection cases, as well as notable United States Supreme Court
cases upon which the Court relied in deciding Johnson Controls.
A.

Fetal Protection Cases

In Wright v. Olin Corp., the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
became the first circuit court to address, in depth, the issue of sex
discrimination in relation to an employer's fetal-protection policy. 9
Olin Corporation (hereinafter Olin) had implemented a fetal vulnerability program under which fertile women4 ° were restricted from
jobs which might have required contact with certain toxic chemicals. 41 The Court held a prima facie case of sex discrimination in
violation of Title VII existed. 42 The Court went on to determine that
the business necessity defense, rather than the BFOQ defense, was
the appropriate theory under which the fetal vulnerability program
should be analyzed. 43 Since the safety of unborn children of employees was "no less a matter of legitimate business concern than
the safety of the traditional business licensee or invitee upon an
employer's premises," the court found that the business necessity
defense to discrimination was available to Olin. 44

37. International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989).
38. Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Olin Corp.,
697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
39. 697 F.2d 1172 (1982).
40. Any woman age 5 through 63 was assumed to be fertile, unless Olin's doctors confirmed
otherwise. Id. at 1182.
41. Id.

42. Id. at 1187.
43. Id. at 1185.
44. Id. at 1189-90.
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Following Wright, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered a sex discrimination case brought by a pregnant X-ray technician in Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital.45 The claimant had
been terminated by her employer after she had informed her supervisor that she was pregnant. 46 The Hayes court determined that
the hospital's policy of excluding pregnant women from jobs involving exposure to radiation raised the presumption of facial discrimination. 47 Such a presumption could be rebutted, however, if
the employer could show that "although its policy applies only to
women, the policy is neutral in the sense that it effectively and
equally protects the offspring of all employees. ' 48 The court went
on to state that even if the hospital established that its policy was
neutral, the policy had a disproportionate impact on women, and
the employee would have an automatic primafacie case of disparate
impact. 49 Under the disparate impact theory, the employer would be
entitled to assert the business necessity defense. 0 Thus, both the
Hayes and Wright courts held that the business necessity defense
was applicable to sex discrimination claims arising from employers'
fetal-protection policies.
B. Dothard v. Rawlinson: "The Essence of the Business" Test
The language of Title VII clearly states that sex discrimination
in employment decisions is impermissible unless sex "is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise." 51 In Dothard v.
Rawlinson, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the BFOQ
defense to be "an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex. ' 52 In this class action
brought by women alleging that they had been denied employment
as prison guards on the basis of sex, the Court in Dothardheld that
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1546.
Id. at 1549-50.
Id. at 1548.
Id. at 1552.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1988).
433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977).
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being male was a bona fide occupational qualification for the job
of a prison guard in a maximum-security state penitentiary for men. 3
The Court determined that a woman's job performance - her ability
to maintain order - could be reduced by the fact that she was a
woman.5 4 The Court clarified what became the "essence of the business" test:" sex discrimination "'is valid only when the essence of
the business operation would be undermined by not hiring members
of one sex exclusively. '56 In Dothard, the Court held the test had
been met.5 7
C. Interpretations of the Language of Title VII, as Amended by
the PDA
The United States Supreme Court has previously interpreted the
language of Title VII to mean what it clearly states: classifications
based on sex are unlawful.5 8 In City of Los Angeles Department of
Water and Power v. Manhart, the Court held the Department of
Water's policy, which required female employees to make larger
contributions to a pension fund than their male counterparts because
females have greater longevity, violated Title VII 9 The Court stated
that "[e]ven a true generalization about the class is an insufficient
reason for disqualifying an individual to whom the generalization
does not apply .... Practices that classify employees in terms of
... sex ...
tend to preserve traditional assumptions about groups

rather than thoughtful scrutiny of individuals." 6
In Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, the
United States Supreme Court verified the language of the PDA by
stating that "for all Title VII purposes, discrimination based on a
53. Id. at 336-37.

54. Id. at 336. The Court explained that the prison inmates had been deprived of a normal
heterosexual environment and individuals who had been convicted of sex offenses were present. Thus,
the risk of assault to a female guard existed. Id. at 335-36.
55. International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 1196, 1205-06 (1991).
56. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977) (quoting Diaz v. Pan American World
Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971)).
57. Id. at 336-37.

58. City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 709 (1978).
59. Id. at 711.

60. Id.at 708-09.
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woman's pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because of her
sex." ' 6' The Court in Newport News held the company's health insurance plan, which provided less extensive pregnancy benefits to
spouses of male employees than it provided to female employees,
violated Title VII.62 Since the sex of an employee's spouse is the
opposite of the sex of the employee, the Court reasoned, discrimination against female spouses in the providing of benefits was discrimination against male employees. 63 Thus, the Court has previously
held that the PDA does mean what it says: discrimination on the
64
basis of a woman's ability to become pregnant is prohibited.
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted Title VII to
mean that an explicitly gender-based discriminatory policy of an
employer may be defended only as a BFOQ. 65 In Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp.,66 the Court held the employer's hiring policy, which
expressly excluded women who had preschool age children, could
be defended only as a BFOQ. 67 The apparently benign motives of
the employer in establishing the discriminatory policy did not lead
68
to the consideration of the more lenient business necessity defense.

IV. TBE

MAJORITY OPINION IN JOHNSON CONTROLS

Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, began his discussion
of the issues in Johnson Controls69 with the statement that Johnson
Controls' fetal-protection policy was clearly discriminatory on its
face. 70 He determined the only defense available to the company was
to establish that sex was a bona fide occupational qualification for
the positions from which fertile women were excluded.7 1 Blackmun

61.
62.
63.
64.

462 U.S. 669, 684 (1983).
Id.
Id.
International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1210 (1991).

65. Id. at 1204.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

400 U.S. 542 (1971).
Id. at 544.
International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1204 (1991).
Id. at 1196 (1991).
Id. at 1202.
Id. at 1204.
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then held that the BFOQ defense is extremely narrow 72 and does
not encompass sex-specific fetal-protection policies such as that of
Johnson Controls .73 Blackmun reviewed the statutory language of
Title VII, the language of the PDA, the relevant case law, and the
legislative history of the PDA, which all served to support his claim. 74
A.

The Necessity of a BFOQ Defense

Immediately in his analysis, Blackmun stated that, because Johnson Controls' policy excluded women of child-bearing capacity from
certain jobs, the policy created a sex-based discriminatory facial classification. 75 He analogized the case to that of Martin Marietta76 in
which a similarly benign motive of the employer did not alter the
fact that the employer's policy was sex-based discrimination. 77 Blackmun further supported his statement by referencing the language of
7
the PDA and its interpretation by the Court in Newport News.
Under the PDA, Johnson Controls' explicit classification on the
basis of potential pregnancy was sex discrimination in violation of
79
Title VII.
Since Johnson Controls' fetal-protection policy was facially discriminatory in violation of Title VII, Blackmun stated that it could
be defended only by Johnson Controls demonstrating that sex was
a bona fide occupational qualification for the jobs from which fertile
women were excluded.80 He attacked the analysis used by the Court
of Appeals and the Wright and Hayes courts which had inquired
whether the employer in each case had established its fetal-protection
policy was justified as a business necessity." Blackmun again relied

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id. at 1207.
Id. at 1204-07.
Id. at 1202.
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971). See supra text accompanying notes

66-68.
77. International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1203 (1991).
78. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983). See supra
text accompanying notes 61-63.
79. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1204.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1203.
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on the Court's reasoning in Martin Marietta,8 2 in which the Court
determined an employer's facially discriminatory policy could be defended only under the BFOQ inquiry.83 Blackmun also referenced
a Policy Guidance issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) which stated the BFOQ defense was appropriate in fetal-protection cases.8 4 The language of Title VII itself
provides support for Blackmun's assertion. The only exception to
unlawful sex discrimination stated therein is "in those certain instances where ... sex ... is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business .... ",85

B. Narrowness of the BFOQ Exception to Sex Discrimination
Blackmun addressed next the question of whether Johnson Controls' fetal-protection policy was within the BFOQ exception to unlawful sex discrimination.8 6 He stated that the BFOQ defense is
extremely narrow.8 7 He first considered the Court's interpretation
of the BFOQ defense. In Dothardv. Rawlinson, the Court held that
"the BFOQ exception was, in fact, meant to be an extremely narrow
exception to the general prohibition of discrimination on the basis
of sex." '8 8 Blackmun then considered age discrimination cases because the BFOQ language of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 (ADEA)89 parallels that of Title VII. He cited Western
Air Lines v. Criswell,9" in which the Court held the BFOQ exception
was meant to be an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition against age discrimination.9 1
82. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
83. Id. at 544.
84. International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., III S. Ct. 1196, 1204 (1991).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1988).
86. Johnson Controls, I1 S. Ct. at 1204.
87. Id.
88. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977).
89. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1988). The provision reads: "It shall not be unlawful for an employer
... to take any action otherwise prohibited under [this statute] where age is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business .... "
90. 472 U.S. 400 (1985) (holding that the airline company's policy, which required flight engineers to retire at age 60, violated the ADEA).
91. Id. at 412.
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Blackmun next examined the specific language of the BFOQ defense which indicates the situations in which sex discrimination is
permissible are extremely limited. 92 He stated the words within the
statute such as "certain instances," "normal operation," and "particular business" indicated that an objective, verifiable requirement
exists in the determination of those situations in which discrimination is allowable. 93 Blackmun focused on the legislature's use of
the term "occupational" qualification which indicates that Congress
limited the term "qualification" to include only those job requirements which concerned job-related skills. 94 Under this reasoning,
Johnson Controls would have to show that sex was a bona fide job
requirement necessary for battery making. Blackmun attacked Justice
White's definition of the term "occupational qualification" in
White's concurring opinion, which was simply a "job-related qualification. ' ' 9 Blackmun claimed White's interpretation rendered the
term "occupational" unnecessary, and thus did not reflect the in96
tention of Congress.
Blackmun considered Johnson Controls' assertion that its policy
fell into the category of cases in which sex discrimination was allowable because of safety concerns. 97 Referring to Dothard, Blackmun stated that sex discrimination because of safety concerns is
allowable only in limited circumstances. 98 In Dothard, sex was a
BFOQ because the employment of a female prison guard would
create a real risk of violence, and the safety of third parties would
be threatened. 99 Blackmun compared Dothardto airline cases in which
pregnant flight attendants were terminated because of the necessity
of ensuring the safety of airline passengers. 10 Such layoffs were
92. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1988). The section provides that "it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees ... on the basis of ... sex ...
in those certain instances where . .. sex .. . is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise ......
93. International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 11 S. Ct. 1196, 1204 (1991).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1210, n.l (White, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 1205.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 336 (1977).
100. International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1205 (1991).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol94/iss1/10

12

Moorman: International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc.: Sex-Specific Fetal
1991]

FETAL PROTECTION POLICIES

allowable because there was evidence that pregnant flight attendants
were more likely to be incapacitated during emergency evacuations
than nonpregnant flight attendants.10' As in Dothard,the safety of
third parties would be threatened if the airlines' discriminatory policies were not upheld.
Blackmun attacked White's concurring opinion for ignoring the
"essence of the business" test which had been established clearly in
Dothard.02 White's concurrence stated that "protecting fetal safety
while carrying out the duties of battery manufacturing is as much
a legitimate concern as is safety to third parties in guarding prisons
(Dothard)or flying airplanes (Criswell)."'0 3 Blackmun distinguished
Johnson Controls from Dothard and Criswell on the basis that in
the latter two cases, third party safety considerations were crucial
to the employee's job performance; moreover, that job performance
involved the central purpose of the employer's business. 1°4 However,
Blackmun stated, the safety of potential fetuses is not the essence
of the business of a battery manufacturer. 05 He asserted that the
narrow BFOQ defense should not be expanded to include the social
concern of the employer for the possibility of injury to future children. 106
Blackmun proceeded to verify his interpretation of the narrow
BFOQ defense by examining the language of the PDA. 10 7 This
amendment to Title VII states that "women affected by pregnancy
...or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all
employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected
but similar in their ability or inability to work ... ."0 As applied

101. Harriss v. Pan American World Airways, 649 F. 2d 670, 675 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that
an airline's policy, which required that female flight attendants take maternity leave immediately upon
learning of their pregnancy, was justified under the BFOQ defense); Condit v. United Air Lines, 558
F.2d 1176, 1176 (4th Cir. 1977) (holding that an airline's policy, which prohibited stewardesses from
flying from the time they learned that they were pregnant, was justified under the BFOQ defense).
102. 433 U.S. at 333. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
103. 111 S. Ct. at 1213 (White, J., concurring).
104. Id. at 1206.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
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to the present case, female employees, who are as capable of doing
jobs as their male peers, may not be forced out of a job due to
their potential to become pregnant. 1°9
Blackmun turned next to the legislative history of the PDA. He
stated the PDA's purpose was to protect female employees from
being treated differently solely due to their child-bearing capabilities. 10 Indeed, the legislative history of the PDA indicates that, prior
to its passage, women were viewed by their employers as potentially
pregnant individuals and, therefore, marginal workers."' The goal
of the PDA was to eliminate discrimination based on pregnancy in
order to forward the goal of Title VII which is to provide equal
employment opportunities." 2 Blackmun was correct in his contention
that such a purpose would be inconsistent with the expansion of the
BFOQ defense to include fetal-protection policies such as that of
Johnson Controls. 1 3
After thoroughly examining case law, the language of the BFOQ
provision, the PDA, and legislative history, Blackmun concluded
that an employer is prohibited from discriminating against a woman
on the basis of her capacity to become pregnant unless this reproductive capability actually prevents her from performing her job
responsibilities." 4 Blackmun held that Johnson Controls did not establish a BFOQ defense because fertile women "participate in the
manufacture of batteries as efficiently as anyone else.""' 5 Blackmun
emphasized that Congress, through Title VII and the PDA, mandated that decisions regarding the safety of children should be made
by their parents, rather than by their parent's employer." 6 These
federal statutes "simply do not allow a woman's dismissal because
7
of her failure to submit to sterilization. ' "

109. International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1206 (1991).
110. Id.
111. H.R. REP. No. 95-948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 5, at 6-7 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4754-55.
112. H.R. REp. No. 95-948 at 7, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4755.
113. International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1207 (1991).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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Tort Liability Concerns
The majority of state courts do recognize a right to recover for
a prenatal injury based on either negligence or wrongful death. " 8
For example, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has held
that an action may be maintained by the personal representative of
a viable unborn child for the wrongful death of the child caused
by injuries sustained while in its mother's womb resulting from the
negligence of the defendant. 19 Judges and lawyers have raised concerns regarding employer's potential tort liability resulting from the
20
prohibition of fetal-protection policies.
C.

Blackmun briefly discussed the issue of employer tort liability
arising from the present Johnson Controls decision. 121 He noted that
after having considered the problem of lead exposure, OSHA stated
that "there is no basis whatsoever for the claim that women of
childbearing age should be excluded from the workplace in order
to protect the fetus or the course of pregnancy.' ' 2 2 Furthermore,
Blackmun stated, there must be a determination of negligence on
the part of the employer in order for the employer to be liable in
tort for fetal injury.12 1 If, while operating without sex-specific fetalprotection policies, an employer informs a woman of the risk of
fetal injury stemming from her job responsibilities, and the employer
is not negligent, "the basis for holding an employer liable seems
24
remote at best.'
Blackmun next discussed the issue of pre-emption which is raised
in Justice White's separate opinion. 2 5 Because Johnson Controls did
118. Deborah M. Santello, Note, Maternal Tort Liabilityfor PrenatalInjuries, 22 SUFFOLK U.
L. REv. 747, 753-54 (1988).
119. Baldwin v. Butcher, 184 S.E.2d 428, 434 (V. Va. 1971) (reversing judgment for defendant
in a case where the decedent, in the womb and viable at the time when its mother was a passenger
in the defendant's vehicle, was stillborn two days after receiving injuries in an automobile accident).
120. International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., II S. Ct. 1196, 1208 (1991).
121. Id. at 1208-09.
122. Id. at 1208 (citing 43 Fed. Reg. 52952, 52966 (1978)). OSHA has also determined that male
workers, as well as female workers, may be adversely affected by lead. "Male workers may be rendered
infertile or impotent, and both men and women are subjected to genetic damage which may affect
both the course and outcome of pregnancy." 43 Fed. Reg. 52952, 52966 (1978). Such evidence may
add additional strength to the assertion that the sex-specific fetal-protection policy of Johnson Controls
was not justified.
123. Johnson Controls, Il1 S. Ct. at 1208.
124. Id.
125. Justice White asserted that "it is far from clear that compliance with Title VII will preempt state tort liability . .. ." Id. at 1211 (White, J., concurring).
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not argue that it faced costs due to state tort liability, the preemption issue was not before the Court. 2 6 However, Blackmun referenced the Court's decision in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers

v. Paul'27 in which the Court held that when compliance with both
federal and state law is impossible, federal law pre-empts that of
the state. 128 He went on to analogize the Johnson Controls case to

Farmers'Educational& Cooperative Union of America v. WDA Y'29
in which the Court held a federal law prohibiting censorship by a
broadcasting station carried with it immunity from liability for defamation under state tort law. 130 The Court in WDA Y stated that
"we have not hesitated to abrogate state law where satisfied that
its enforcement would stand 'as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.""'
Similarly, Blackmun stated that state tort law which prevented employers from hiring qualified women due to their child-bearing capabilities would impede the purpose of Title VII.112
Blackmun concluded his discussion of tort liability by stating that
the extra cost of potential tort liability does not justify policies which
exclude fertile women from the workplace. 33 Blackmun referenced
the Court's decision in Manhart in which the Court held that even
if a generalization is true, it is an insufficient reason for disqualifying
an individual to whom the generalization does not apply. 13 4
Although Johnson Controls has important ramifications in the
field of employment law, Blackmun contends that the holding is not
remarkable. 3 5 The PDA clearly prohibits discrimination on the basis
126. Id. at 1208-09.
127. 373 U.S. 132 (1963) (upholding a California statute which contained regulations regarding

the maturity of avocados, because it was not impossible to comply with both federal and state standards).
128.
129.
130.
131.
U.S. 767,
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 142-43.
360 U.S. 525 (1959).
Id. at 531.
Id. at 535 (quoting Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330
773 (1947)).
International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1209 (1991).
Id.
City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978). See supra text accompanying

notes 58-60.
135. 111 S. Ct. at 1209-10.
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of pregnancy or related conditions. 1 6 A woman's capacity to bear
children is a pregnancy-related condition. Thus, as Blackmun states,
the Court in Johnson Controls has done "no more than hold that
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act means what it says."' 137

V.

THE

CONCURRING OP-iIoNs

Justice White issued a separate opinion, which was joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, in which he concurred
with the majority on their holding that summary judgment in favor
of Johnson Controls had been improper. 138 White did, however, find
problematic two parts of the majority's opinion. He thought the
majority had interpreted the BFOQ defense too narrowly.3 9 He also
expressed greater concerns than the majority had in relation to the
40
potential tort liability of employers resulting from the decision.
White first asserted that the language of the BFOQ exception to
sex discrimination in Title VII does not indicate that the statute
could never support a sex-specific fetal-protection policy." 4 This is
undoubtedly true, as the statutory language is necessarily very general. However, the Court's interpretation of the statute has indicated
that, in order to meet its purpose of prohibiting sex discrimination,
the BFOQ defense is necessarily a very narrow one that does not
encompass sex-specific fetal-protection policies.
White discussed Dothard and Criswell in order to demonstrate
that discrimination is allowable under the BFOQ defense when the
safety of third parties, such as fetuses, is at risk. 142 However, as
Blackmun noted, White ignored the "essence of the business" test
which had been established in Dothard.143 That is, White did not
consider the fact that sex discrimination under a sex-specific fetal-

136.
137.
138.
139.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., Ill S. Ct. 1196, 1210 (1991).
Id. at 1210 (White, J., concurring).
Id. at 1214.

140. See id.at 1211-12.
141. Id. at 1210.
142. Id. at 1212-13.
143. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977). See supra text accompanying notes 56-
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protection policy would be valid only if the essence of Johnson
Controls' battery manufacturing operation would be undermined by
not hiring men exclusively. 144
White claimed that the PDA had not restricted the scope of the
BFOQ defense as Blackmun claimed it had. 145 White asserted that
the legislative history of the PDA, as well as its interpretation by
the Court, indicated that the PDA was only an amendment to the
definitions section of Title VII. 146 He stated its purpose was to make
clear that pregnancy and related conditions were to be included within
Title VII's antidiscrimination provisions. 47 Whether the PDA served
to narrow the scope of Title VII BFOQ exceptions to discrimination
or only served to apply Title VII prohibitions to discrimination on
the basis of pregnancy, seems to be a question without great significance in this case. The law is clear: "Women affected by pregnancy . . . or related medical conditions shall be treated the same
for all employment-related purposes ... as other persons not so
affected but similar in their ability or inability to work . . . . ,,14"

Finally, White criticized the majority's assertion that since Title
VII bans sex-specific fetal-protection policies, if an employer fully
informs women of job-related risks to potential fetuses and does
not act negligently, the basis for holding that employer liable for
fetal injury would be very limited. 149 White postulates that employers
face a real risk of tort liability to future children. 50 As he points
out, a parent may not release the cause of action of his or her child,
and negligence of the parent may not be imputed to the child.' 5'

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1205-06 (1991).
Id. at 1213 (White, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., II S. Ct. 1196, 1211 (1991) (White, J.,

concurring).
150. Id.
151. Id. In re Estate of Infant Fontaine, 519 A.2d 227, 230 (N.H. 1986); Collins v. Eli Lilly
Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 53, n.14 (Wis. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984); Doyle v. Bowdoin
College, 403 A.2d 1206, 1208, n.3 (Me. 1979); Littleton v. Jordan, 428 S.W.2d 472, 475 (Tex. 1968);
Fallow v. Hobbs, 147 S.E.2d 517, 519 (Ga. 1966); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 488(1)

(1965).
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However, since federal law pre-empts state law,1 52 it may be that
the statutory prohibition against discrimination on the basis of pregnancy carries with it an immunity from state tort liability for fetal
injury in the absence of employer negligence. 5 As Blackmun indicated, this issue has not yet come before the Court.154 It appears
likely that in the future the Court will necessarily be called upon
to resolve the tort liability issue. Employers will then have a basis
on which to predict their degree of liability to potential children.
Justice Scalia issued a separate opinion in which he concurred
in the judgment of the majority, but expressed reservations regarding
some of the majority's reasoning. Scalia found two of the majority's
areas of discussion to be irrelevant in light of Title VII, as amended
by the PDA. 155 Specifically, although the majority pointed out that
evidence existed of the dangers of lead to the male reproductive
system, 156 Scalia stated that treating women differently on the basis
of pregnancy is prohibited regardless of the adverse effects of lead
on the male reproductive system. 5 7 The majority also stated that
Johnson Controls offered no evidence indicating that substantially
all fertile women would be unable to perform their job responsibilities safely. 58 Scalia asserted that even if all pregnant women placed
their unborn children at risk by taking jobs with lead exposure,
under Title VII, it is for parents to make such decisions affecting
their children. 59
Scalia agreed with the majority that any action required by Title
VII cannot give rise to tort liability under state law. 60 However, he
believed that it was possible that "Title VII has accommodated state
tort law through the BFOQ exception.' 16' As the pre-emption ques152. See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
153. International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., Ill S. Ct. 1196, 1209 (1991).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1216 (Scalia, J., concurring).
156. Id. at 1203.
157. Id. at 1216 (Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia reasoned that even in the absence of evidence
of the harmful effects of lead on the male reproductive system, treating women differently on the
basis of pregnancy would still be sex discrimination under the clear language of the PDA. Id.
158. Id. at 1208.
159. Id. at 1216 (Scalia, J., concurring).
160. Id.

161. Id.
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tion was not before the Court in this case, it remains to be seen
how this issue will be resolved.
Finally, Scalia disagreed with the majority that increased costs
to an employer cannot support a BFOQ defense. 162 However, since
Johnson Controls did not assert a BFOQ based upon increased costs,
this is another issue which was not definitively resolved in the present
case.

VI.

ANALYSIS

Although Justice Blackmun described the Johnson Controls decision as unremarkable,' 61 it is significant for several reasons. First,
the Court affirmed that the clear language of the PDA means exactly
what it says: discrimination on the basis of pregnancy will not be
tolerated. Importantly, the decision clarified that if an employer's
policy is facially discriminatory, the only defense that is available
to the employer is the BFOQ defense established in Title VII. The
business necessity defense, used previously by federal appellate courts,
is not appropriate. Moreover, the Court affirmed its previous holding that the BFOQ exception to illegal discrimination is an extremely
narrow one. Finally, the Court issued a clear statement to employers
that sex-specific fetal-protection policies are prohibited by Title VII,
as amended by the PDA.
The Johnson Controls decision has already had an impact on
decisions in the lower courts. In the case of O'Loughlin v. Pinchback,164 a Florida court relied heavily on Johnson Controls in its
holding that a correctional officer employed at the county jail had
been unlawfully discriminated against when she was terminated due
to her pregnancy.' 65 Further, the Johnson Controls decision was also
broadly interpreted by the court in Hargett v. Delta Automotive,
Inc. 66 which held that the defendant's discharge of an employee

162. Id.
163. Id. at 1209-10.
164. 579 So. 2d 788 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
165. Id. at 796. The court determined that under Johnson Controls, since the employer's policy
was not facially neutral, the business necessity defense was inapplicable. The only available defense
was the BFOQ, which the employer had failed to establish. Id. at 793-95.
166. 765 F. Supp. 1487 (N.D. Ala. 1991).
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violated the PDA because the employee had established that her
pregnancy was a factor in the termination decision. 67 Other courts
have cited Johnson Controls when discussing pre-emption 16 8 and the
interpretation of statutory law. 169 Although the Johnson Controls
decision left some issues open to resolution in the future, Blackmun's
thorough analysis and clear, strong statements will cause the decision
to continue to be of important precedential value.
Although Blackmun does not discuss potential tort liability concerns resulting from the Johnson Controls decision in detail, the
impact of the decision on tort liability issues will be of great concern
to employers. Because Blackmun refers to compliance with OSHA
standards in his discussion of an employer's avoidance of tort liability, 170 it is likely that employers' attention to compliance with
these standards will increase. Increased attention to workplace safety
and health standards resulting from Johnson Controls would be a
beneficial consequence of the decision. A safer work environment
for all employees would likely accompany increased attempts to protect potential fetuses.
By excluding women from jobs solely on the basis of their capacity to bear children, Johnson Controls made several assumptions:
1) that fertile women employees were sexually active or would be
in the future, 2) that fertile women employees were sexually active
with fertile men, 3) that the fertile women employees who were

167. Id. at 1494. The court stated that "[aiccording to Johnson Controls, Congress has put
firmly in place a public policy giving pregnant women a substantial degree of extra protection against
any form of adverse treatment in the work place, no matter who else may be hurt." Id.
168. Richardson v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 935 F.2d 1240 (l1th Cir. 1991) (stating that
a state law prohibiting school systems from employing uncertified teachers may not be a defense in
a Title VII action brought by a black uncertified teacher who had claimed that the school board had
wrongfully refused to renew her contract).
169. Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 111 S. Ct. 2631, 2638 (1991) (stating that,
in an action by taxpayers seeking redeterminations of deficiencies assessed against them, the Court

is deeply reluctant 'to interpret a statutory provision so as to render superfluous other provisions
in the same enactment'

(quoting Pennsylvania Public Welfare Dept. v. Davenport, 110 S. Ct. 2126,

2133 (1990))).
170. International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1208 (1991). Immediately
following his discussion of OSHA standards, Blackmun states "[w]ithout negligence, it would be
difficult for a court to find liability on the part of the employer." Id.
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sexually active with fertile men would be unable to consider the risk
of workplace hazards to fetuses and take contraceptive measures or
make informed decisions regarding their placement in such jobs, or
both. 17' Johnson Controls' fetal-protection policy was based upon
the assumption that the company was better suited to protect the
safety interests of women employees' future offspring than the women
themselves.172 With its recent holding, the Supreme Court has ensured that the law is taking steps forward from the decision of Mul-

ler v. Oregon73 in 1908, not backward. 74 Although the concern of
companies for the welfare of future children is praiseworthy, the
Johnson Controls decision has made it clear that these companies
may not reach their goals at the expense of the ability of women
to obtain and keep jobs for which they are qualified. 7 5
VII.

CONCLUSION

In Johnson Controls, the Supreme Court held that Title VII, as
amended by the PDA, prohibits employers from implementing sexspecific fetal-protection policies.' 76 The Court relied on the statutory
language of Title VII and the Court's previous interpretations of
the statutory language to hold that the business necessity defense,
previously used by lower courts, is not an appropriate means of
analyzing employers' sex-specific fetal-protection policies.' 7 When
an employer's fetal-protection policy is facially discriminatory, the
employer's only available defense is to establish that sex is a BFOQ
for the jobs from which fertile women are excluded. 7 The BFOQ

171. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. California Fair Employment & Housing Comm'n., 267 Cal. Rptr.
158, 177 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that Johnson Controls' fetal protection policy was discriminatory and not defensible as a BFOQ).
172. Id. at 177-78.
173. 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908) (upholding an Oregon statute, which forbade women from working
greater than ten hours a day in a laundry, on the basis of the fact that women on their feet for long
periods of time tend to injure their bodies, "and as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring,
the physical well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve
the strength and vigor of the race.").
174. See Mary E. Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. Cam.
L. REv. 1219 (1986).
175. 267 Cal. Rptr. at 178.
176. International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., I11 S. Ct. 1196, 1209-10 (1991).
177. 111 S. Ct. at 1203-04.
178. Id. at 1204.
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defense is extremely narrow and does not encompass sex-specific
fetal-protection policies such as that of Johnson Controls.1 79
The Johnson Controls decision left questions concerning potential employer tort liability unresolved. However, the Court's clear
analysis of existing law and sound reasoning make the decision an
important precedent. Importantly, the Court affirmed the language
of the PDA: discrimination on the basis of pregnancy or related
conditions is prohibited. Blackmun contended that the Johnson Controls decision was unremarkable. However, the decision is especially
significant in light of the generally conservative stance of the existing
Court regarding other women's issues. While forbidding employers
from implementing sex-specific fetal-protection policies, the Court
has ensured that women will be protected from losing their jobs on
the basis of their fertility.

Amy H. Moorman

179. Id. at 1204, 1207.
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